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Abstract— In this paper, we address the problem of cooperative
black hole attack, one of the major security issues in mobile ad
hoc networks. The aim of this attack is to force nodes in the
network to choose hostile nodes as relays to disseminate the par-
tial topological information, thereby exploiting the functionality
of the routing protocol to retain control packets. In optimized
link state routing (OLSR) protocol, if a cooperative black hole
attack is launched during the propagation of topology control
(TC) packets, the topology information will not be disseminated
to the whole network which may lead to routing disruption. In
this paper, we investigate the effects of the cooperative black
hole attack against OLSR, in which two colluding MPR nodes
cooperate in order to disrupt the topology discovery. Then we
propose an Acknowledgment based technique that overcomes the
shortcomings of the OLSR protocol, and makes it less vulnerable
to such attacks by identifying and then isolating malicious nodes
in the network. The simulation results of the proposed scheme
show high detection rate under various scenarios.
Keywords – Ad Hoc Networks, Routing Protocols, OLSR,
Security, Cooperative Black Hole.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many applications, mobile ad hoc networks may be deployed
in a hostile environment. Due to numerous constraints such as, lack
of infrastructure, dynamic topology and lack of pre-established trust
relationships between nodes, most of the envisioned routing protocols
are vulnerable to a number of disruptive attacks. In this paper, we
focus on the cooperative black hole attack which is known to be
particularly challenging to defend against [5], and has been shown to
be potentially damaging to a wide range of ad hoc routing protocols.
In black hole attacks, hostile nodes in general advertise availability
of a fresh route without checking their routing tables. In this process,
attackers always happen to be the first to reply to a route request in
reactive routing context, and thus intercept the data packets being
relayed and retain them. Furthermore, a special case of black hole
attack, called gray hole attack, is mentioned in [4] in which only part
of packets are retained while the other part is relayed. In the literature
[5], [9], there are similar definitions of black and gray hole attack.
However, a gray hole attack is considered as a special case of the
black hole attack that has a similar impact but more difficult to detect.
When this attack targets a proactive routing protocol, such as OLSR,
where attackers may retain topology control packets, nodes in the
entire network would be unable to get the right picture of the network
topology. This will result in disrupting severely the communications
as attackers will always be chosen by their neighbors as potential
next hops to the destinations.
In this paper, we introduce an efficient method to detect cooper-
ative black hole attacks. It uses an acknowledgment approach to as-
certain the effective dissemination of topology control packets within
the network. First, each MPR (MultiPoint Relay) node have to learn
about its neighborhood up to three hops away, and then it piggybacks
in its next TC message a request to an acknowledgment only from a
selected subset of this set. Upon reception of the TC message, each
node from this subset responds by an authenticated acknowledgment
to confirm the reception of the identified TC message. By monitoring
the number of missing acknowledgments, each MPR node can verify
whether a cooperative black hole attack is carried out in its vicinity or
not. To mitigate the impact of this attack, the detected malicious nodes
will be excluded from the forwarding process by simply ignoring their
Hello packets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
summarizes the literature. Section III provides a short overview on
OLSR, followed by the description of a cooperative black hole attack
in section IV. In section V, we present the proposed acknowledgment
based scheme to detect the misbehaving nodes. Section VI describes
our simulation model and analyzes the obtained results. Finally,
section VII discusses future research directions and concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, a number of protocols and mechanisms have been
proposed to secure wireless ad hoc routing. In [3], a new protocol
called CONFIDANT is proposed, which aims at detecting malicious
nodes by means of combined monitoring, reporting and establishment
of routes that avoid misbehaving nodes. In this scheme, events have to
be observable and classifiable for detection, and reputation can only
be meaningful if the identity of each node is persistent, otherwise it
presents vulnerabilities to spoofing attacks.
Another approach is proposed in [5] to defend against black hole
attack in AODV, where they use further request and further reply
packets to check the validity of a node that sends the route reply
before sending the data packets. This solution assumes that malicious
nodes do not exist in groups, although this is quite possible in real
situations.
[6] proposes a neighborhood based method to defend against black
hole attack. The solution can be briefly described as follows: once the
normal path discovery procedure in the routing protocol is done, the
source node sends a special control packet to request the destination
to send its current neighbor set. By comparing the received neighbor
sets, the source node can determine whether there is a black hole
attack in the network. To mitigate the impact of the black hole attack,
they designed a routing recovery protocol to establish the path to the
correct destination.
The most effective and recent method to defend against black
hole attacks is the watchdog/pathrater mechanisms[2]. This method
detects misbehaving nodes acting alone by maintaining a buffer that
contains recently sent packets. When a node forwards a packet, the
node’s watchdog ensures that the next node in the path also forwards
the packet. The watchdog does this by listening to the next node
promiscuously. If the next node does not forward the packet then
it is termed as misbehaving. In other words, in this scheme, every
packet that is overheard by the watchdog is compared with the packet
in the buffer to see if there is a match. A match confirms that the
packet has been successfully delivered and it is removed from the
buffer. If a packet has remained in the buffer beyond the timeout
period then a failure counter for the node responsible for forwarding
the packet is incremented. If this counter exceeds a pre-determined
threshold then the node is termed as malicious and the network is
informed accordingly.
In [10], the authors present a new collusion attack model against
OLSR, where the first colluding node declares in its Hello message
all the 2 hop neighbors of the attacked node in order to force this
latter to choose it as its unique MPR. The second attacker, acting as
MPR of the first attacker, will then drop all the packets origintaed
from the attacked node and passing through it. To defend against this
attack, they propose to modify the standard Hello message to contain
the 2 hop neighbors list. Based on this information a node can detect
whether one of its neighbors has sent a false Hello message or not by
looking at contradictions in the sets. However, these contradictions
can no more stand if the attacker sends false neighbors set which are
different from the legitimate node’s 2 hop neighbors.
III. OLSR DESCRIPTION
The Optimized Link State Routing protocol (OLSR) [7] is a
proactive routing protocol designed to work in dense networks. The
main optimization of the protocol is achieved through MPRs, a set
of neighbor nodes that are unique nodes in the network responsible
for generating and distributing partial link state information during
the flooding process, thus reducing the message overhead.
In OLSR, each node selects its MPR set from its 1 hop neighbors
such that it can reach easily all its 2 hop neighbors. MPR selection
process depends on the ’Willingness’ value obtained from Hello
message. This value indicates the willingness of a node, based on
its own resources, if it is able to forward packets of other nodes. The
higher the willingness is, the higher the priority the node will have
to be selected as MPR. The value Will never is chosen by nodes
that are not willing to participate in the routing process. However,
the value Will always is reserved for nodes which are candidate to
be selected as MPRs.
Control traffic in OLSR is exchanged through two different types
of messages, namely ’Hello’ and ’TC’ messages. Hello messages
are exchanged periodically (every 2s) between nodes to detect links
between each others, to detect the identity of neighbors and to
advertise MPR selections. A TC message is sent to the whole
network’s nodes periodically by each MPR node to declare its MPR
selectors set. Information contained in TC message is used in the
construction of the routing tables in each network’s node.
IV. COOPERATIVE BLACK HOLE ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we describe how two adjacent malicious nodes
can launch a black hole attack in wireless ad hoc network. To ease
understanding the illustration, we summarize bellow the notations and
assumptions used throughout this paper. First, we assume that links
are frequently symmetric. We assume also that each node holds a set
of secrets for all other nodes. For example, the secret Kij , stored
within a node i, is the secret associated to node j. The secret is
assumed to be symmetric between any pair of nodes, i.e, Kij = Kji,
and are undisclosed to any other node in the network. The following
Figure 1: A cooperative attack model
Figure 2: Cooperative black hole attack description
notations are also used to illustrate the cooperative black hole attack
in OLSR.
• N1: the MPR set of node D.
• N2: the MPR set of N1’s nodes which are not in D’s one hop
neighborhood, i.e.,
∀n (n ∈ N2 ⇒ ∃m (m ∈ N1 ∧ T ))
T ≡ n ∈ MPR set (m) ∧ n /∈ neigh (D)
• Symi: the symmetric 3 hops away neighbors which have to
send out an 3hop ACK packet.
• Si: the subset of symmetric neighbors 3 hops away reached
through the node n ∈ N2.
In order to launch the black hole attack in OLSR, a malicious
node can force its election as MPR by maintaining constantly its
Willingness field to Will always in its HELLO message. According
to the protocol, its neighbors will always select it as MPR. Using this
mechanism, a malicious node can easily earn, as an MPR, a privileged
position within the network. It can then exploit its rank to carry out
deny of service attacks and alike. In a more sophisticated way, two
colluding MPR nodes m1 and m2 can launch a more severe attack
when the node m2 drops all TC messages forwarded by node m1.
The attacked node, in the set of MPR selectors of m1, can not detect
this misbehavior because node m2 is out of its radio range.
Fig. 1 shows an illustrative description of this cooperative black
hole attack. Let nodes {A1,..., Am} be a set of nodes to be attacked
and T2, U2 the attacker nodes, {T1,..., Tn} the set of D’s MPR nodes,
{U1,..., Up} is the subset of D’s 2 hop neighbors which constitutes
the N1’s MPR nodes and {V1,..., Vq} the set of D’s 3 hop neighbors.
The attack is launched as follows: node T2 sends its HELLO message
with the value of Willingness field as Will always, i.e, all its 1
hop neighbors will choose it as an MPR. Then it chooses the node
U2 as the only MPR node to relay its TC message. By doing this,
Figure 3: Topology perceived by nodes C2, C4 and C5 after
attack
node U2 can perform the following misuses without being detected
by node D or any other node in its neighborhood:
• Drop all TC messages generated by node D, i.e, which contains
addresses of nodes {A1,...., Am}. This will avoid the links
status of D’s MPR selectors to reach the nodes that are only
connected to U2. This means that some nodes in the network
can not communicate with the D’s MPR selectors set.
• Drop TC messages generated by node T2 which contains the
address of D to prevent link information of D from being
disseminated to the nodes reached through it. It can also drop
all TC messages passed through it.
• Modify the content of TC messages generated by node D to
cause inconsistent topology information dissemination.
The consequence of this attack is devastating in the pres-
ence of multiple colluding attackers around the victim node. The
sender/forwarder of TC message overhears its MPR nodes trans-
mission to ensure whether or not its sent/forwarded TC is relayed,
but while the TC dropping happens out of the sender/forwarder
transmission range this technique failed to detect it.
Fig. 2 shows an example of this attack. Nodes B1, B2 and B3
constitute the MPR selectors set of node A. The first attacker X
advertises itself as having the sufficient resources to forward packets
of other nodes by setting its willingness field to the highest allowed
value (i.e, the value 7). According to the protocol, X will be chosen
as the A’s MPR. Afterward, X chooses the second attacker Y as its
unique MPR node. Thus, all TC packets generated by node A and
relayed by X will be destroyed by Y .
The consequence of this attack is illustrated in Fig. 3, where nodes
C2, C4 and C5 can not build a route toward D’s MPR selectors
because the D’s TC messages are never received (i.e, the topology
information held by these nodes is incomplete).
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to deal with the cooperative black hole attack, we present
an acknowledgment based scheme to mitigate the loss of topology
information due to the dropping of TC messages by attackers.
In addition to the original control message of OLSR, i.e, Hello
and TC messages, our scheme introduces another two kinds of
control packets, which are called 3hop ACK and HELLO rep.
The 3hop ACK message is used by a node to acknowledge its
reception of a TC message from the neighbors 3 hops away, and
the HELLO rep message is used by a node to advertise its 2 hop
neighbors to a requesting MPR node. For the request, we use one
of the unused bits in the HELLO message to indicate whether the
sender’s MPR nodes should generate HELLO rep packet or not.
Table I shows the format of HELLO rep message.
Our scheme requires that each MPR node should know its 3 hop
neighbors set in order to be able to verify whether a malicious
node, sitting out of its transmission range, misuses the transmitted
MPR node 2 hops neighbors
Y C1 C2 C3
A2 A1 A5 A7
Table I: Example of HELLO rep message sent by node X
TC messages. Our scheme also requires that each MPR node has to
forward all TC messages from its MPR selectors even if a message
is received more than once. As such, the scheme can distinguish
whether a TC message is dropped intentionally by a malicious node
or by a legitimate node just because of the duplication of two TC
messages.
To detect the misbehaving nodes, the sender or forwarder of the
TC message maintains a list of TC packet identifiers (IDs) that have
not received any 3hop ACK packet from symmetric neighbors 3
hops away. Also, a number of parameters need to be maintained, as
follows:
• ACKmiss: Counter for the number of 3hop ACK missed on
the link M1 ←→ M2 such that M1 ∈ N1 and M2 ∈ N2.
• TCdrop: Counter for the number of TC dropped by the direct
MPR node.
• SNT : List of nodes which should send out a 3hop ACK for
each pair of nodes <M1, M2>.
• δ1 and δ2: Threshold for TC packets dropped and 3hop ACK
packets missed respectively ( δ1<δ2).
• BlackList: List of misbehaving nodes.
When a node, say, A sends or forwards a TC message to its
neighbors, it monitors its MPR’s transmission to verify whether MPR
nodes relay the packet or not. If A doesn’t overhear that of MPR
node B, it increases its TCdrop. If TCdrop exceeds δ1, A adds B’s
identity to the BlackList and recalculates the MPR set without node
B. Another more complicated case is the case where node B forwards
the TC message sent by A, while it doesn’t punish its MPR node C
which drops the TC message. To deal with this case, node A increases
the ACKmiss counter for the link B−C whenever the timer, which
is set up to limit the reception delay of 3hop ACK packets for this
link, exceeds the predefined threshold. If node A receives a Hello
message from B in which C is not in B’s MPR set, while ACKmiss
does not exceed δ2, A then adds C to its Suspiciouslist; otherwise,
node A concludes that both nodes B and C are malicious and adds
them to its BlackList.
Suspiciouslist is used by a MPR node A to record the IDs
of nodes that drop the Acknowledgment packets but move out of
the forwarding path of TC messages before their Ackmiss counter
reaches the threshold. As the network’s topology changes rapidly,
suspicious nodes can gain the same position in the forwarding path
of TC messages sent/forwarded by the node A. A then accumulates
the new observations with the previous ones for a more accurate
punishment.
On receiving Hello or TC message, each node deals with it as
algorithms 1 and 2.
Our scheme is summarized as follows:
1) First step: Get all neighbors 3 hops away
• For each node i of the N1 set, node D implicitly asking
it to send its MPR set (i.e, MPR nodes of i) and the
neighbors of these MPRs (i.e, 2 hops neighbors of i
reached through these MPRs).
• Upon reception of HELLO message in which
HELLO id is set to 1, each node of the N1 set
responds with a HELLO Rep packet containing the
required information.
• Each MPR node sets the HELLO id field to 1 whenever
it detects a change in its MPR set or its N2 set.
2) Second step: Sending or forwarding TC message with request
of acknowledgment
Algorithm 1 HELLO reception
1: if orig adr /∈ BlackList then
2: if Id = 1 then
3: if orig adr ∈MPR sel set then
4: prepare HELLO rep pkt
5: send HELLO rep pkt
6: end if
7: process HELLO msg
8: else
9: process HELLO msg
10: end if
11: end if
Algorithm 2 TC reception
1: if (orig adr, PSN)/∈ duplicate set then
2: if my Id ∈ Req ack list then
3: prepare 3hop ack pkt
4: send 3hop ack pkt
5: end if
6: process TC
7: else
8: if sender addr ∈ MPR selc set then
9: add its own Request ack list to TC pkt
10: forward TC pkt
11: end if
12: end if
• For each node of the N2 set, the node D chooses a
neighbor node such that:
∀i symi /∈
j =k⋃
j=1,...,p
k=1,...,p
( Sj ∩ Sk )
p = ‖N2‖


( c )
• When the node D generates its TC message or forwards
a TC message received from its MPR selectors, it inserts
a request for an acknowledgment to all nodes of the set
X , before sending it out.
X = {Sym1, ..., Symp}
• Since PKI-based authentication is not suitable to
MANETs due to the high computational complexity, we
adopt an alternative solution proposed in [8] to validate
the identity of 3hop ACK sender, which has moderate
computation complexity and low bandwidth consumption.
A. Discussion
In Fig. 4, node D may choose node C3, where C3 ∈(SY1 ∩ SY2 ),
to send back a 3hop ACK. In this case, node C3 can be reached
through both Y1 and Y2 of the set N2. We suppose that Y2 is a
legitimate node while Y1 is a misbehaving node. Since D maintains
a list of nodes that should send 3hop ACK, when node C3 receives
a TC message forwarded by Y2, it sends a 3hop ACK to D. When
D gets this acknowledgment, it will delete C3 from the SNT list.
Thus node D believes that both nodes Y1 and Y2 have relayed its
TC message, but actually node Y1 did not forward it. Even node Y1
forwards the TC message, node C3 sends back only one 3hop ACK
because it processes only the first TC message it received and ignores
Figure 4: Topology perceived by nodes C1 and C2 when the
condition c is not satisfied
Figure 5: The 3hop ACK scheme functioning
the later one that has the same originator address and MSN( Message
Sequence Number).
B. The 3hop ACK scheme operation
Since our scheme works at the network layer, it can be im-
plemented as an adds on to OLSR protocol. The scheme detects
individual malicious nodes by using a new type of Acknowledgment
packets, named 3hop ACK. The 3hop ACK packet is assigned a
route of 3 hops in the opposite direction of TC packet route as shown
in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5, A is assumed to be an MPR node, B ∈ N1, C ∈ N2 and
D the A’s 3 hops neighbor which should send back the 3hop ACK.
When node A detects changes in its N1 or N2 set, it sends a HELLO
message with the HELLO id field set to 1. Upon reception of this
message, each node from the set N1 sends a HELLO Rep packet to
A. When TC timer expires, node A generates its TC message along
with a request for acknowledgment to the node D. This message
will be forwarded by B and C respectively. Each receiver of this TC
message checks whether its identity is included in the request list for
acknowledgment; if so, it returns an authenticated 3hop ACK packet
(as shown in Fig. 5). When node A receives such packet, it decrypts
it using the shared secret key with the anticipated sender, verifying
whether the packet is sent by a legitimate node or not. Finally, node
A concludes that the two consecutive MPR nodes in this forwarding
path behave well. This process is repeated for every quadruplet of
nodes as < B, C, D, E >, < C, D, E, F > and < D, E, F , ...
>, where the first 3 nodes are MPR nodes and the last one may not
be an MPR node.
C. Security analysis of 3hop ACK scheme
Our scheme is robust to a variety of attack scenarios conducted
by either independent or collusive malicious nodes. In particular, we
consider three typical scenarios as follows:
Figure 6: Delivery ratio vs. node pause time
• Scenario 1: a node in N1 set responds with a faulty list of 2
hop neighbors in which it adds non neighbor nodes, or deletes
some nodes from this list. According to our scheme, when node
D receives the Hello rep from node X it chooses one of the
nodes listed in the 2 hop neighbors list, requiring it to send
a 3hop ACK. If the selected node is not an actual 2 hop
neighbors of X , D would not receive a 3hop ACK. As a result,
node X will be punished.
• Scenario 2: a node in N2 set drops the TC message and
fabricates a 3hop ACK packet on behalf of the requested
node. In order to fabricate this packet, the node must spoof
the requested node identity and generates a valid response. But
it could not compute the valid 3hop ACK due to the lack of
knowledge on the secret key pre-shared between the requester
and requested nodes.
• Scenario 3: a node X2 ∈N2 relays the TC message correctly but
drops the 3hop ACK packet. This behavior would be detected
as well, as the node X1 ∈ N1 monitors its behavior and deletes
it from the 1 hop neighbor list when the ACKmiss counter
reaches the threshold δ2.
VI. SIMULATION MODEL AND RESULTS
This section reports the performance evaluation on our scheme
by using extensive simulations conducted with the network simulator
OPNET 11.5 [11]. We embedded our scheme in the implemented
OLSR protocol for detecting the cooperative black hole attack. We
generated random topologies with M nodes over a rectangular field,
where M ranges from 30 to 100. The rectangular field size is varied
from (1500x1000m) to (2500x2000m). The maximum transmission
range of each node is 250m. We run the simulation for 600s. Random
waypoint model [1] is used as the mobility model of each node. Nodes
speed is varied from 2 m/s to 25 m/s. We change node pause time
from the highest mobility (i.e, zero pause time) to 300 seconds. We
use the default setting for Hello and TC messages generations as in
the specification of OLSR [7]. The percentage of malicious nodes is
varied from 25% (which launches 4 cooperative black hole attacks) to
40% (which launches 20 cooperative black hole attacks). To launch
the attack, the first attacker chooses randomly a victim node from its
MPR selector set that has to be an MPR of the other neighbors.
A. Cooperative Black hole attack simulation
To illustrate the consequence of this attack, we generated traffic
between a source node and a destination node where they are more
than 3 hops away. In our scenario, this chosen destination node has as
its MPR the attacked node. We define also the delivery ratio as a value
of the number of received data packets to that of packets being sent
by the source node. The results are shown in Fig. 6, and we observe
that in the presence of the attack, the delivery ratio is 10% when node
Figure 7: Comparaison of the average number of TC messages
received
pause time is 0 and 30 seconds and it drops to 5% when node pause
time goes to 60 seconds. The reason is that, when the destination
node moves faster, it has more chances to select nodes other than
the victims as MPRs and thus receives more packets; while with the
lower mobility, it forces the destination node to select victim nodes
as MPRs, thereby leading to fewer routes to be established between
the source node and the destination.
B. Performance evaluation
We conducted extensive simulations to evaluate the performance
of our scheme and show the results in Fig. 7, where the meaning of
three curves are explained as follows,
• Under attack, robustness disabled: average number of receptions
of each TC message generated by MPR nodes when there are
attacks and our scheme is not used.
• Under attack, robustness enabled: average number of receptions
of each TC messages generated by MPR nodes when there are
attacks and our scheme is used.
• Without attack: average number of receptions of each TC
messages generated by MPR nodes when there are no attacks.
Clearly, Fig. 7 shows that the average number of TC messages
received by nodes decreases sharply when the network is under
attacks and no robustness. In this case, some nodes have a partial
image of the network topology because of the no reception of all TC
messages generated by MPR nodes, therefore they could not establish
routes to some other nodes.
When the attack is launched and our scheme is used, the average
number of TC messages received is small at the beginning because
the attacker node drops TC messages generated by victim nodes.
This number increases at each time an attack is detected, and finally
it approaches to the number of TC messages received when there
is no attack. The implicit reason is that, once a malicious node is
detected, the victim nodes elect a new MPR set of legitimate nodes
which forwards the TC messages correctly.
Fig. 8 shows the relationship between detection rate and node
pause time. We see that generally the detection rate increases as the
node pause time turns to larger. Especially, when node pause time
is 0, i.e., nodes move continuously, the MPR sets of nodes change
rapidly, thereby malicious nodes can drop packets and move away
before its failure counter reaches the threshold. In another word, the
frequency of changing of MPR set decreases with the increase of
pause time, so when pause time gets larger, MPR sets is more stable
over time and the performance of our scheme gets better.
In order to observe the number of false alarms triggered by our
scheme, we generate a network with random topology and consists
of 100 nodes, among which 40% are malicious nodes. As shown in
Fig. 9, Y axis is the number of false alarms, X axis is the timeout
Figure 8: Detection rate vs. node pause time
Figure 9: Number of false alarm vs. timeout value
value δ, and the maximum speed of nodes varies from 0 m/s to 30
m/s and is divided into 3 ranges. We observed that the number of
false alarms is generally proportional to the nodes speed and reduces
with the increasing timeout value. We also observe that δ = 0.3 is the
optimal threshold, after which false alarm never occur when mobility
speed range is [0, 5] and [8, 15], while only 2 false alarms keep
occurring for mobility speed range [20, 30].
VII. CONCLUSION
Cooperative black hole attack is one of the most sophisticated
attack that may result in dramatic disruption of the network perfor-
mance. When launched against the OLSR protocol, a misbehaving
node exploits the routing protocol’s vulnerabilities to always par-
ticipate in the forwarding process of TC messages, and when it
colludes with another adjacent MPR node, they cooperate to prevent
the dissemination of these TC messages generated by the original
node in order to false the discovery of the network topology.
In this paper, we have analyzed the cooperative black hole attack in
ad hoc networks and proposed an acknowledgment based scheme to
detect malicious nodes and isolate them from the forwarding process.
We conducted extensive simulations and the results showed high
detection rate under various scenarios with negligible false positive
alarms.
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